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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Kendall Q. Northern, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
N. Eldon Barnes, et al., 
Respondent. 
Case No, 
Priority No. 13 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following questions are presented for review: 
I. Did the Court of Appeals erroneously hold that habeas 
corpus is not available as a remedy to modify a release date 
ordered by the Board of Pardons? 
II. Did the Court of Appeals err by refusing to address the 
question of whether the Board of Pardons violated its own 
procedural and substantive rules and thereby denied Northern due 
process of law? 
OPINION BELOW 
The Court of Appeals1 opinion, Northern v. Barnes, is found at 
179 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 and is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this petition under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991) which grants the Utah 
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over "a judgment of the Court 
of Appeals." The Court of Appeals opinion was filed on January 24, 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the 
writ holding that habeas corpus is not available as a remedy in 
this case to modify the release date ordered by the Board of 
Pardons. 
C, STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 30, 1980, at age eighteen, Northern was convicted by 
guilty plea of second degree murder and aggravated robbery, both 
first degree felonies. Northern was sentenced to two five-to-life 
sentences at the Utah State Prison. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order of Dismissal ("Findings of Fact") No. 
1. 
On July 8, 1981, Mr. Northern had an initial hearing before 
the Board of Pardons, which determined that Mr. Northern would be 
paroled from the Utah State Prison on May 10, 1988. Findings of 
Fact No. 2. 
During the summer of 1984, the Board of Pardons received 
information from the Utah State Prison which established that Mr. 
Northern had had a drug problem and that he had abused drugs during 
the first two years of his incarceration. Findings of Fact No. 3. 
On September 24, 1984, the Board of Pardons considered Mr. 
Northern's incarceration status, pursuant to a written request for 
a reconsideration of his parole date. Findings of Fact No. 11. 
Accompanying the request was a caseworker's recommendation to 
shorten Northern's term of incarceration. The Board of Pardons 
determined that Northern's parole date of May 10, 1988, should 
remain intact. Findings of Fact No. 4. In March 1986 Mr. Northern 
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1992 and an ex parte extension of time of fourteen days to file 
this petition was requested and granted on February 24, 1992. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes or 
rules pertinent to the questions presented for review is contained 
in the body of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This case originally was an appeal from the trial court's 
dismissal of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and/or Writ of 
Mandamus and/or Declaratory Judgment. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW. 
Northern filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and/or 
Writ of Mandamus and/or Declaratory Judgment on March 30, 1990, 
seeking to have certain actions of the Board of Pardons declared 
unlawful and to have the trial court order that he be placed on 
parole. 
On July 27, 1990, trial was held at which time the court heard 
testimony, accepted documentary evidence and heard the arguments of 
counsel. At the conclusion of the trial, the court took the matter 
under advisement. On September 26, 1990, the trial court ruled 
from the bench and denied Northern's Petition. On December 7, 
1990, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Order of Dismissal, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Addendum B. 
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was transferred to the Duchesne County Jail. He gained trustee 
status and during the next two years worked outside of the jail. 
On February 25, 1988, jail authorities learned that Northern 
had possessed marijuana without incident. This fact was reported 
to the Utah State Prison and subsequently obtained by the Board of 
Pardons sometime prior to May 10, 1988. Findings of Fact No. 6. 
Northern had communications with Paul Larsen of the Board of 
Pardons prior to May 10, 1988, as attempts to work out the details 
of an intensive supervision parole were made. Neither at that nor 
at any later time was Northern's possession of a small amount of 
marijuana in February 1988 raised as an allegation of misconduct 
that would interfere with his parole date. Deposition of Paul W. 
Boyden, dated July 6, 1990. 
In May 1988 the Board of Pardons had certain policies in 
effect which governed its actions and proceedings including Rule 
3.10 which, in pertinent part, read as follows: 
310-1. Policy 
The release or rehearing date established by the Board of 
Pardons shall remain in effect [except] upon written referral 
indicating that the offender is in violation of the rules and 
regulations of the Utah State Prison, Community Corrections 
Centers, or laws of any local, state or federal government, or 
new evidence is presented that an inmate, if released, would 
present a serious risk or danger to the community. 
310-2. Procedure 
Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing date, 
information shall be provided to the Board establishing the 
basis for the rescission hearing. Upon receipt of such 
information, the offender will be scheduled for a rescission 
hearing. Except under extraordinary circumstances, the 
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offender will be notified of all allegations and the date of 
the scheduled hearing at least seven days in advance. 
Findings of Fact No. 12. 
On May 9, 1988, the Board of Pardons rescinded Mr. Northern's 
May 10, 1988, parole release date. Findings of Fact No. 13. Prior 
to the May 9, 1988, rescission, Northern was not notified of any 
allegations relating to the rescission nor did the Board of Pardons 
hold any kind of hearing. In the document detailing the 
rescission, the Board of Pardons made the following remark: 
"Continue for another psychological evaluation and complete prison 
progress report." Findings of Fact No. 13. 
On Jun 23, 1988, the Board of Pardons scheduled a hearing for 
July 8, 1988, to review Northern's status. Findings of Fact No. 
15. At that hearing on July 8, 1988, Northern was permitted to 
address the Board of Pardons, present information to the Board, and 
to respond to questioning from the Board. Findings of Fact No. 16. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board of Pardons affirmed the 
rescission of Northern's May 10, 1988, parole release date based 
upon his "risk to society" and the need for "appropriate 
punishment," and rescheduled a rehearing for May, 1990. Findings 
of Fact No. 17. 
Northern petitioned for extraordinary relief during his term 
of incarceration. During the appeal from the trial court's denial 
of his petition, Northern was paroled. As a new condition of 
parole, the Board required Northern to pay $26,350.00 in 





THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE THE 
COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT HABEAS CORPUS 
IS NOT AVAILABLE AS A REMEDY IN THIS CASE. 
When the Court of Appeals held that "habeas corpus is not 
available in this case as a post-release remedy to modify the 
release date ordered by the Board," it rendered a decision in 
conflict with decisions of this Court and decided an important 
question of state law which should be settled by this Court. Utah 
R. App. P. Rule 46(b) and (d) . Indeed, the importance of the 
question is reflected by the fact that the respondents requested 
transfer of the case to this Court. That request was denied by the 
Court of Appeals, Northern v. Barnes, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 58 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). Because of the importance of the Court of Appeals1 
action and potential impact on numerous cases beyond this case, the 
Supreme Court should review the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
In Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), 
this Court specifically held that "there is no question that habeas 
corpus review of the Board of Pardon's action is available." The 
Court of Appeals1 opinion in this case sidestepped Foote by 
mischaracterizing the nature of Mr. Northern's claims. Had the 
Court of Appeals addressed the issues raised (as stated below), the 
Court could have reached no other conclusion than that Foote 
applied to this case. 
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1990) provided a 
retrospective of the writ of habeas corpus, and the observation 
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that "the writ provided a judicial means for securing the liberty 
of a person restrained by arbitrary or oppressive power." Hurst at 
1033. It specifically recognized the writ of habeas corpus as a 
necessary tool of the judiciary so it can be "armed with process 
sufficient to fulfill its role as the third branch of government." 
Hurst at 1033. 
The Court of Appeals1 conclusion that habeas corpus is not 
available to Mr. Northern, and its disregard of the violation of 
the substantive and procedural due process rights of Mr. Northern 
(whose parole date was wrongfully rescinded through both procedural 
defects and lack of legitimate basis), is inconsistent with this 
Court's opinion in Foote that: "It is the province of the 
judiciary to assure that a claim of the denial of due process by an 
arm of government be heard and, if justified, that it be 
vindicated." Foote at 4. In its designation of Northernfs due 
process claims as merely a claim that he should have been credited 
on parole for the additional years he served beyond his original 
parole date, the Court of Appeals improperly manipulated and 
characterized the claims to reach its conclusion that a writ is not 
available. 
Northern presented the first opportunity since Foote for 
appellate review of specific Board of Pardons procedures regarding 
the interpretation and significance of its rules regarding 
rescission of an inmate's parole date — and the extent to which an 
inmate is entitled to due process, including notice and a hearing, 
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in such Board action. Foote anticipated the flushing out of such 
due process requirements in future cases. 
District courts around the state are taking increasingly 
assertive actions toward the Board of Pardons, which continues to 
claim that under Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1953 as amended) its 
actions are beyond judicial review. In December 1991 the Third 
District Court in Rawlinas v. Utah Board of Pardons. Case No. 
910905068, ordered the Board to give Rawlings post-conviction, pre-
commitment credit for time served. In February 1992 the Third 
District Court in Smith v. Utah Board of Pardons, Case No. 
910903060, considered via a writ Smith's claim that the Board had 
ignored the order of Fourth District Court Judge Boyd Parks that 
Smith be given 626 days credit for post-conviction time served 
prior to his commitment to prison. In soundly criticizing the 
Board, Judge David Young wrote: "This entire area of law allows 
the Board of Pardons to engage in discriminatory practices that 
jeopardizes the credibility of the Board...." A third case in a 
similar view, Jensen v. the Utah Board of Parsons, case no. 
920901144CV, is now pending in the Third District Court. Whether 
discriminatory practices occur at the front end of a sentence 
because of the Board's unlawful practices or at the back end (in 
its refusal to honor parole dates set by earlier Boards just 
because its present members believe that the crime inherently 
demanded a longer incarceration), appellate courts must decide the 
parameters of the Board's discretion to act in these areas. The 
Court of Appeals' decision in this case is a retrenchment from this 
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Court's opinion in Foote. Certiorari should be granted to clarify 
for the Court of Appeals, the Board of Pardons and other pending 
litigants the jurisdictional and substantive issues raised by Mr, 
Northern. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI BECAUSE THE 
COURT OF APPEALS REFUSED TO DECIDE IMPORTANT ISSUES OF 
DUE PROCESS WHICH WERE PROPERLY PRESENTED TO IT 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Mr. Northern asserted inter 
alia; (1) that the Board of Pardons denied him due process because 
it violated its own procedural and substantive rules, (2) that the 
trial court erred which it applied an unusual definition to the 
term "new evidence" as used in Rule 3.10 of the Board's rules and 
that, if a plain and literal meaning had been given to the term, 
there was no "new evidence" to justify the Board's rescission of 
Northern's parole date, and (3) that Mr. Northern was not given 
notice of the evidence and reasons for the Board's rescission of 
his parole date. (A copy of the Argument portion of Mr. Northern's 
brief to the Court of Appeals is included as Addendum C.) In its 
opinion the Court of Appeals addressed none of these issues, opting 
instead to state that the issues were "without merit." 179 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 17. In so holding the Court of Appeals departed from 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. Utah R. 
App. P. Rule 46(c). This Court should decide these important 
issues of state law. Utah R. App. P. Rule 46(d). 
In order to function appropriately and effectively, the Board 
of Pardons is subject to certain rules and regulations which govern 
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its actions and proceedings. In May 1988, Board of Pardons Rule 
3.10, which is set out in the Statement of Facts, provided that 
Board's policies and procedures regarding the setting and the 
rescinding of a parole date and of the necessity of giving an 
inmate notice of a rescission hearing and the opportunity to be 
heard before a rescission occurs. Findings of Fact No. 12. 
Rule 3.10 was certainly adopted in recognition of the Board of 
Pardons1 duty to afford due process to prisoners in determining 
their sentence. Fundamental notions of fair play require that the 
Board of Pardons adhere to those rules and any failure to do so was 
a denial of due process. International House v. National Labor 
Relations Board, 676 F.2d 906, 912 (2nd Cir. 1982); Bills v. 
Henderson. 631 F.2d 1287, 1299 (6th Cir. 1980); Government of Canal 
Zone v. Brooks, 427 F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 1970). The trial court 
also recognized this proposition when it stated that "once a parole 
date has been granted, it cannot be taken away by the Board of 
Pardons inappropriately or unreasonably or upon the whim of the 
Board members.11 Conclusions of Law, p. 7. 
The trial court found, as a matter of law, that the Board of 
Pardons complied with these rules. Unfortunately, the record in 
this case demonstrates that such a conclusion was erroneous and 
that the Board of Pardons violated its own rules in a number of 
respects. 
The language of Rule 3.10 is plain and unambiguous. As such, 
it should be construed according to its clear and literal language. 
Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth. 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); Cox Rock 
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Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction, 754 P.2d 672, 676 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a fundamental 
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). The Utah Supreme Court recognized much 
the same principle when is stated that an established principle of 
due process is that a court, or in this case a governmental body 
acting in place of a court, "hears before it condemns, proceeds 
upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial." Christiansen 
v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1945). The provisions of Rule 
3.10 seek to meet this due process requirement. 
The obvious import of Rule 3.10 is that a hearing is to be 
held before the rescinding of a parole date. If it were not so, 
there would be no need for the rule to state that "the offender 
will be scheduled for a rescission hearing" because the rescission 
would have previously occurred [emphasis added]. 
Northern was not given a hearing prior to the rescission of 
his parole date. Findings of Fact No. 13. In fact, a hearing was 
not held until July 8, 1988 — over two months after Northern's 
parole date had been rescinded. Common sense requires that the 
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner be provided before any deprivation of rights occurs. The 
Board of Pardons cannot hold a hearing some two months after the 
deprivation of a right has taken place and then claim that it has 
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afforded Northern the due process to which he was entitled when 
having the length of his sentence determined. 
The trial court seems to have held that the failure to hold a 
rescission hearing was proper because extraordinary circumstances 
existed which justified the rescission of Northern's parole date 
without providing prior notice to Northern. Conclusions of Law, p. 
9, Assuming, arguendo, that such extraordinary circumstances 
existed, these circumstances only excused the requirement that 
Northern be "notified of all allegations and the date of the 
scheduled hearing at least seven days in advance." A plain reading 
of the rule reveals that the extraordinary circumstances exception 
has no application to the requirement that a rescission hearing be 
held prior to the rescinding of a parole date. Thus, Northern was 
entitled to, but did not receive, a rescission hearing prior to 
having his May 10, 1988 parole date rescinded. 
The procedures of Rule 3.10 further required that the Board of 
Pardons notify Northern of the allegations against him at least 
seven days in advance of the rescission hearing. Northern was not 
informed of any of the allegations against him prior to the July 
1988 hearing, and at that hearing he was not notified of any 
allegations. 
Each of these violations of Rule 3.10 by the Board of Pardons 
denied Northern his right to due process. International House, 676 
F.2d at 912; Bills, 631 F.2d at 1299, Government of Canal Zone, 427 
F.2d at 347. The record shows that the Board of Pardons condemned 
before it heard and inquired only after passing judgment. 
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Christiansen, 163 P.2d at 316. There can be little doubt that 
Northern's parole was indeed taken away at "the whim of the Board 
members" who, only after the fact, sought to justify and legitimize 
their actions. 
The trial court defined "new evidence" as found in Rule 3.10-1 
as any information about Northern not available to the Board in 
July 1981. Consequently, the six year presence of Northern within 
the prison system was new evidence; his omission after the initial 
Board of Pardons hearing to reaffirm or reacknowledge his remorse 
and regret about his crimes was new evidence; and the difficulty of 
the Board of Pardons in creating an intensive parole program for 
Northern, who was to be paroled to his home state of Arizona, was 
new evidence. This definition is error. The plain and literal 
meaning of the term "new evidence" in Rule 3.10 is evidence which 
was previously concealed from the Board of Pardons or specific, 
affirmative acts that occurred or became known subsequent to an 
inmate's last review or consideration by the Board of Pardons. 
Because all else was known by the Board members or its agents, 
under this definition, the only new evidence the Board of Pardons 
had upon which to base its rescission of Northern's parole was a 
recent Psychological Evaluation — a report which specifically 
stated that it was to be viewed as a favorable report. 
The most fundamental principle of due process is notice. The 
only notice ever given Northern concerning the basis for rescission 
of his parole date was that he was a risk to society and needed to 
be appropriately punished for his crime. Due process required that 
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Northern be given notice of the reasons for the Board of Pardons1 
decision and the evidence it relied on in reaching that decision. 
Thus, the trial court erred in finding only that there was some 
basis upon which the Board of Pardons could have rescinded 
Northernfs parole rather than determining the actual grounds upon 
which the Board of Pardons rescinded Northern's parole. 
By refusing to address these important and properly raised 
issues of due process, the Court of Appeals deviated from the usual 
course of judicial proceedings. These issues will arise in other 
cases and should be addressed by this Court. 
DATED this J ^ T d a y of March, 1992. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
Jo/^ Carol Nesset-Sale 
:orney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ? 'Say of March, 1992, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
to the Utah Court of Appeals was mailed, postage prepaid, to David 
Thompson, Assistant Utah Attorney General, 6100 South 300 East, 




CODE • co Northern 
Provo, Uuh 179 Utah , 
, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (Utah Supreme Court 
held that opening an unoccupied vehicle's door to 
inspect the VIN constituted an unreasonable search 
under Utah Constitution). 
3. See Thompson, 712 F.2d at 1361. Although in 
similar cases we have remanded for more detailed 
findings, see, e.g.. State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 
771 (Utah App. 1990), in this case the record at the 
suppression hearing is sufficiently detailed to allow 
us to determine whether or not the State has met its 
burden. See State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 151 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 65 (1991); 
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 
1990). 
4. The Castners also allege that they were illegally 
detained. The trial court made no finding as to 
whether the Castners were illegally detained after 
Gustin issued the citation. The court did not address 
this issue because the Castners did not raise it 
below. We will not consider an argument on appeal 
unless it was raised at the trial court. State v. Mar-
shall, 791 P.2d 880, 884 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 
800 P.2d 1105 (1990). Thus, we decline to address 
this issue. 
5. We note, that on appeal, the Castners challenge 
the search of the pouch found m the back seat, and 
the pouch taken from Bonnie Castner's purse. 
However, the Castners have waived their right to 
challenge the evidence found in the purse since this 
issue was not raised below. See Marshall, 791 P.2d 
at 886; State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 n.2 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
Cue as 
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IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Kendall Q. NORTHERN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
N. Eldon BARNES, Warden, Utah State 
Prison and the Department of Corrections 
through the Board of Pardons, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 900566-CA 
FILED: January 24, 1992 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson 
ATTORNEYS: 
Jo Carol Nesset-SaJe, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Lorenzo K. Miller, and 
Kirk M. Torgensen, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellees 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Garff. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
v. Barnes 
idv. Reo. IS 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Kendall Q. Northern unsuccessfully petiti-
oned the trial court for a writ of habeas 
corpus following a decision of the Board of 
Pardons (the Board) to rescind his original 
parole date. Northern appealed the
 N trial 
court's decision, but was subsequently paroled 
during the pendency of this appeal. We 
affirm. 
FACTS 
In 1980, Northern, an eighteen-year-old 
drifter, pleaded guilty to second degree murder 
and aggravated robbery for his participation in 
the shooting death of a cab driver earlier that 
same year. Northern was sentenced to two five-
to-iife sentences at the Utah State Prison. He 
later admitted he was under the influence of 
LSD at the time of the shootmg, and had been 
deeply involved in drugs. 
After Northern had been imprisoned for a 
year, the Board met and granted him a May 
10, 1988 parole date. The Board reconsidered 
Northern's status in 1984, and determined 
that the 1988 parole date would remain intact 
despite evidence that Northern had used drugs 
at the prison during his incarceration. 
In 1986, Northern was transferred to the 
Duchesne County Jail where he attained 
trustee status. Over the next two years, Nort-
hern was allowed to work unsupervised 
outside the jail. In early 1988, with only a few 
months remaining before his projected parole, 
jail authorities discovered that Northern was 
again using drugs. This information was rep-
orted to the prison and received by the Board 
before his parole date. 
Two months before his parole date, a psy-
chological assessment of Northern was made 
at the request of the Board. The report indi-
cated that Northern had been a heavy drug 
user, and had been unable to deal with life's 
stresses without drugs. The report also said 
Northern acknowledged that his drug depen-
dence was a major factor contributing to his 
antisocial behavior. Before the report was 
published, the Board also attempted to obtain 
Northern's consent to additional terms of 
release that would have included drug testing. 
On the advice of his father, however, Nort-
hern refused to consent to the new conditions. 
On May 9, 1988, the Board rescinded Nor-
thern's May 10 parole date, pending further 
review, and ordered another psychological 
evaluation. The need for another psychological 
evaluation and complete prison progress report 
was listed in the written notice by the Board as 
the ground for rescinding Northern's original 
parole date. The supplemental assessment 
focused on potential problems affecting Nor-
thern's adjustment into society posed b> his 
relationship with his father. A full rescission 
hearing was then scheduled for July 8, 1988.1 
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At that hearing, the Board determined that 
Northern continued to be a risk to society, 
and refused to grant him parole at that time. 
The Board scheduled a rehearing for May 
1990, and Northern was returned to the Duc-
hesne County Jail. Two months later, 
however, he escaped and fled to Canada. The 
Board then rescinded the rehearing scheduled 
for May 1990. Northern was captured and 
returned to prison on October 6,1989. 
Northern petitioned for extraordinary relief 
and habeas corpus under Rule 65B(b)(2) and 
(4), and (0 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.2 The petition prayed for (1) declaratory 
relief as to the unlawfulness of* Northern's 
confinement since May 10, 1988, (2) a demand 
for his immediate release, and (3) damages in 
excess of $10,000 for "breach of contract" on 
the ground that a parole date created a legally 
binding agreement on the State. After a 
hearing, the trial court denied the petition, 
and Northern filed a notice of appeal. The 
Board subsequently set a July 1991 parole 
date, and required restitution of $26,350 by 
Northern as a condition of parole. Northern 
agreed to the new conditions, and was paroled 
on July 9, 1991, while this appeal was 
pending. 
ANALYSIS 
In general, the purpose of extraordinary 
relief under Rule 65B is to test the lawfulness 
of imprisonment, and the propriety of any 
related proceedings, by forcing a judicial 
hearing. See Ziegler v. Miliken, 583 P.2d 
1175, 1176 (Utah 1978). Northern presents no 
authority, however, for extending the purposes 
of extraordinary writs as a procedure to bring 
contract claims. We also conclude that the 
demand for Northern's immediate parole is 
moot because parole was granted subsequent 
to the filing of this appeal. Spain v. Stewart, 
639 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah 1981).* We are ther-
efore left only with Northern's prayer for 
declaratory relief as to the unlawfulness of his 
"confinement." 
Inasmuch as Northern is no longer incarc-
erated, we must consider whether his request 
for declaratory relief is also moot. Courts 
have reviewed habeas corpus petitions that 
would have been otherwise rendered moot by 
the release of a prisoner when the prisoner 
suffers "collateral legal consequences" from a 
conviction, such as "the use of the conviction 
to impeach the petitioner's character or as a 
factor in determining a sentence in a future 
trial, as well as petitioner's inability to vote, 
engage in certain businesses, or serve on a 
jury." Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 
1981). 
Northern argues that he would have comp-
leted his parole in May 1991, if the Board had 
not violated his due process rights in rescin-
ding his original parole date. Thus, the request 
for declaratory relief becomes a question of 
v. Barnes CODE«CO 
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whether Northern's extended parole status was 
a collateral legal consequence of alleged due 
process violations. In Jones v. Cunningham, 
371 U.S. 236, 243, 83 S. Ct. 373, 377 (1963), 
the United States Supreme Court held that 
release on parole does not render a petition 
for habeas corpus moot because parole 
"imposes conditions which significantly 
confine and restrain [a parolee's] freedom." 
Since parole imposes conditions of confine-
ment and Northern's parole status past May 
1991 is a consequence of rescinding his orig-
inal parole date, we proceed to address his 
claim for credit against his parole period for 
time served while incarcerated after his orig-
inal parole date. 
In prior cases, discretion to give credit for 
time served was determined to lie solely with 
the Board. In State v. Schreudcr, 712 P.2d 
264, 277 (Utah 1985), the reason given for 
rejecting a similar argument demanding credit 
for time served was the Board's discretion to 
determine the period of time to be served. 
Likewise, in State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207, 
208-09 (Utah App. 1988), we held that Utah 
courts have no authority to grant credit for 
I time served prior to conviction since the power 
to reduce or terminate sentences is vested 
exclusively with the Board under Utah Code 
Ann. §77-27-5(3) (1990). 
Northern suggests that the Board's exercise 
of this discretionary authority is now subject 
to judicial review under the recent case of Foote 
v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 
734 (Utah 1991). We disagree. In Foote, a 
prisoner sought an extraordinary writ, conte-
nding "that the manner in which his parole 
hearings have been conducted [had] deprived 
him of procedural due process." Id. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that, under the Utah 
Constitution, an inmate is entitled to due 
process in proceedings before the Board. Id. at 
735. The supreme court then referred the case 
to a trial court to ascertain factually "the 
procedures followed by the board" and to 
decide what is procedurally required in "the 
conduct of the parole hearings." Id. Since 
Northern was afforded full procedural due 
process by the July 8, 1988 hearing, any of the 
alleged procedural deficiencies in rescinding 
his original parole date were remedied before 
this petition was filed. Northern's claim 
relates, therefore, not to the procedural due 
process issues outlined in Foote, but to the 
reasonableness of the Board's decision in not 
granting Northern credit for the time served 
beyond his original parole date. 
Termination of Northern's sentence is tri-
ggered by "completion of three years on 
parole outside of confinement and without 
violation ... unless the person is earlier term-
inated by the Board of Pardons." Utah Code 
Ann. §76-3-202(l)(1990). "Any time spent 
in confinement awaiting a hearing ... concer-
ning revocation of parole constitutes service of 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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sentence" rather than time on parole. Section 
76-3-202(3Kc). Since the Board has discre-
tion to parole or discharge an inmate at any 
time, see section 76-3-202(5), it could have 
given Northern a parole period of less than 
three years and thereby credited him for the 
time served while incarcerated beyond his 
original parole date. We deem the Board's 
decision to not give Northern an earlier release 
date an exercise of its discretion. 
The Board's right to rely on any factors 
known in May 1988, or later adduced at the 
July 1988 hearing, and the weight to be affo-
rded such factors in deciding whether Nort-
hern posed a societal risk, as well as whether 
an order of restitution was appropriate, are all 
matters within the discretion of the Board. 
They are precisely the kinds of issues that are 
not subject to judicial review under section 77-
27-5(3). Accordingly, we hold that habeas 
corpus is not available in this case as a post 
release remedy to modify the release date 
ordered by the Board. 
We have reviewed the remaining issues 
raised on appeal and deem them to be without 
merit. See State v. Carter, 116 P.2d 886, 888 
(Utah 1989)(it is within our discretion to 
"analyze and address in writing each and every 
argument, issue, or claim raised"). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's denial of the writ is affi-
rmed. 
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
1. The administrative rules of the Board state, as 
policy, that *{a)n offender shall be notified at least 
seven calendar days in advance of a hearing, except 
in extraordinary circumstances, and shall be specif-
ically advised as to the purpose of the hearing. * See 
Utah Admin. R. 655-202 (1991). 
2. Rule 65B was completely reorganized after Nor-
thern's petition was filed. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B 
(amended effective September 1, 1991) and advisory 
committee note. 
3. Although moot questions are generally not cons-
idered on appeal due to the judicial policy against 
advisory opinions, courts have reached the merits of 
an issue that is technically moot, but is "of wide 
concern, affects the public interest, is likely to recur 
in a similar manner, and, because of the brief time 
any one person is affected, would otherwise likely 
escape judicial review ....* Wickham v. Fisher, 629 
P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981). 
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PER CURIAM: 
This appeal is before the court on appellee's 
motion for summary affirmance and on app-
ellant's motion for summary reversal and 
motion for declaratory judgment. Estes 
appeals an order dismissing his petition for 
writ of habeas corpus. We affirm. 
On August 6, 1991, Estes filed a petition 
seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the Sixth 
Judicial District Court of Sanpete County. 
Estes named the acting warden of the Central 
Utah Correctional Facility as the sole defen-
dant. He contended that he was unlawfully 
incarcerated because the board of pardons had 
allegedly violated the due process protections 
guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, based 
upon the recent Utah Supreme Court case of 
Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 
(Utah 1991). 
Appellee Van Der Veur's only connection to 
the petition is that he is the acting warden of 
the Central Utah Correctional Facility, and as 
warden, Van Der Veur has management 
control over the inmates housed in that faci-
lity. On August 15, 1991, appellee's counsel, 
the Utah Attorney General's office, filed a 
motion to dismiss the petition under Rule 
12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for 
failure to state a claim for which relief may be 
granted. Appellee contended that the petition 
was improperly directed to him because it 
contained no allegation that appellee person-
ally had violated appellant's constitutional 
rights. In response, appellant argued that the 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
KENDALL Q. NORTHERN, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
vs 
N. ELDON BARNES, WARDEN, UTAH 
STATE PRISON AND THE DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTIONS THROUGH THE 
BOARD OF PARDONS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
CASE NO. 900901925HC 
(Judge Timothy R. Hanson) 
THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come before the Court for 
trial on July 27, 1990, the plaintiff/petitioner KENDALL Q. 
NORTHERN being present in person and being represented by 
counsel, JO-CAROL NESSET-SALE, the defendants/respondents being 
represented by counsel, C. DANE NOLAN, Assistant Attorney 
General, the Court having heard testimony and accepted 
documentary evidence, the Court having heard the arguments of 
counsel, the Court having reviewed the entire case file and being 
fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mr, Northern is presently incarcerated at the Utah State 
Prison. On July 30, 1980, at age eighteen, he was convicted of 
Criminal Homicide-Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree 
felony, and Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, and 
sentenced to two five-to-life sentences at the Utah State Prison. 
2. On July 8, 1981, Mr. Northern attended a hearing before 
the Utah Board of Pardons. After the hearing the Board of 
Pardons determined that Mr. Northern should be paroled from the 
Utah State Prison on May 10, 1988. 
3. During the summer of 1984, the Board of Pardons received 
information from the Utah State Prison which established that Mr. 
Northern had had a serious drug problem and that he had abused 
drugs heavily during the first two years of his incarceration. 
This information was new information in that it was not available 
l<> I l u : lit in i d LJI 1 ' n j i l o n t J o n J u l y 0 , 1 1)0 1 . 
4. On September 24, 1984 the Board of Pardons considered 
Mr. Northern's incarceration status, including a caseworker's 
recommendation to shorten his term of incarceration, and 
determined that he should not be released on parole prior to the 
scheduled parole date of May 10, 1988. 
5. In March 1986 Mr. Northern was transferred to the 
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Duchesne County Jail. He gained trustee status quickly and 
during the next two years worked outside of the jail. Frequently 
this was unsupervised work including substantial periods of time 
when he labored on the farm of the elderly mother of Mr. Ralph 
Stansfield. At another location he helped construct a fire 
station. During these periods he never attempted to escape. 
6. Also, on February 25, 1988 Mr. Northern was discovered 
using marijuana by jail authorities. This fact was reported to 
the Utah State Prison and subsequently obtained by the Board of 
Pardons sometime prior to May 10, 1988. This information was new 
information in that it was not available to the Board of Pardons 
on July 8, 1981. 
7. On March 24, 1988, the Utah Board of Pardons requested 
that the Utah State Prison perform a Psychological Assessment 
upon Mr. Northern and supply that information to the Board of 
Pardons• 
8. On May 5, 1988 the Board of Pardons received a 
Psychological Evaluation performed by Dr. Al Carlisle, Chief 
Clinical Psychologist at the Utah State prison, and his assistant 
Dr. E. Ted Branthurst. The evaluation indicated that at age 16 
Mr. Northern had left home to wander the western states and 
became deeply involved with drugs and people using drugs. It 
noted that Mr. Northern admitted that he was high on LSD at the 
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time he committed his crime and that he had used LSD, cocaine, 
amphetamines, and marijuana. The report also stated that Mr. 
Northern viewed his drug dependency as a major factor in his 
anti-social behavior* The report indicated that Northern's major 
problem was his inability to deal with life's stresses without 
the use of illegal substances. 
9. In Northern's favor the psychologists noted that while 
at the Utah State Prison and Duchesne County Jail, Northern 
maintained an excellent volunteer and work record, had an I.Q. in 
the superior range, and had completed his Associate of Arts in 
Business and three technical training courses offered by the Utah 
State Prison. The evaluation also noted that Northern had shown 
growth and maturing since his evaluation in 1984 and did not 
appear to have the capacity for violent acting out. The 
psychologists closed the report with a statement that "for 
purposes of the Board of Pardons determinations, this report is 
to be regarded as a favorable one." 
10- This information contained in the May 5, 1988 
Pnyrholoqical Evaluation was new information in that it was not 
available to the Board of Pardons on July 8, 1981. 
11. During his 1984 written request for redetermination to 
the Board of Pardons Mr. Northern did not express any remorse 
about the crimes he had committed or the victims of his crimes. 
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12. In May 1988 the Board of Pardons had certain policies 
in effect which governed its actions and proceedings* In May 
1988 Board of Pardons Rule 3.10, in pertinent part, read as 
follows: 
310-1. Policy 
The release or rehearing date established by the 
Board of Pardons shall remain in effect upon written 
referral indicating that the offender is in violation 
of the rules and regulations of the Utah State Prison, 
Community Corrections Centers, or laws of any local, 
state or federal government, or new evidence is 
presented that an inmate, if released, would present a 
serious risk or danger to the community. 
310-2. Procedure 
Prior to the rescinding of a parole or rehearing 
date, information shall be provided to the Board 
establishing the basis for the rescission hearing. 
Upon receipt of such information, the offender will be 
scheduled for a rescission hearing. Except under 
extraordinary circumstances, the offender will be 
notified of all allegations and the date of the 
scheduled hearing at least seven days in advance. 
13. On May 9, 1988 the Board of Pardons rescinded Mr. 
Northern's May 10, 1988 parole release date. Prior to that 
rescission Northern was not notified of any allegations relating 
to the rescission and no hearing occurred prior to the Board's 
action on May 9, 1988. In the document detailing the rescission 
the Board made the following remark: "Continue for another 
psychological evaluation and complete prison progress report". 
14. The second psychological report was prepared on May 11, 
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1988, by Dr. Carlisle and his psychology intern, Gail Caldwell. 
It considered the issue of how Mr. Northern's relationship with 
his father might affect his success on parole and concluded that 
while the demanding nature of his parents, especially his father, 
might create stress for Northern, his goal was to depend on them 
for emotional support for only a short time after being paroled. 
The report recommended that Northern be paroled to Arizona so he 
could be close to his parents, who were anxious and willing to 
help him adjust to life outside of prison. 
15. On June 23, 1988, the Board of Pardons scheduled a 
hearing for July 8, 1988 to review Mr. Northern's status. Mr. 
Northern received notification of that hearing by June 28, 1988. 
16. On July 8, 1988, the Board of Pardons conducted the 
hearing. At that hearing Mr. Northern was permitted to address 
the Board of Pardons, present information to the Board, and to 
respond to questioning from the Board. 
17- At the conclusion of the hearing the Board of Pardons 
affirmed the rescission of Mr. Northern's May 10, 1988 parole 
release date based upon his "risk to society" and the need for 
"appropriate punishment", and rescheduled a rehearing for May, 
1r) o n 
18. On October 9, 1988, Mr. Northern escaped from the 
Duchesne County Jail. On October 24, 1988, the Board of Pardons, 
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because of Mr- Northern's escape, rescinded Mr- Northern's May 
1990 scheduled rehearing. 
19- Subsequently Mr- Northern was captured and returned to 
the Utah State Prison. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Board of Pardons, in working within the indeterminate 
sentencing scheme of the State of Utah, has the power to consider 
the sentence imposed upon each criminal offender under its 
-jurisdiction and make that offender's sentence determinate. 
The Courts should not interfere or review particular Board 
of Pardons decisions lightly and should not reverse or set aside 
such decisions unless the Board of Pardons has clearly violated a 
constitutional right of the offender. 
It is well established that an offender has no right to be 
given a parole date by the Board of Pardons- However, once a 
parole date has been granted, it cannot be taken away by the 
Board of Pardons inappropriately or unreasonably or upon the whim 
of the Board members. 
The question presented by this case is whether there is a 
reasonable basis supporting the Board of Pardons' decision to 
rescind Mr- Northern's May 10, 1988 parole date. Board Rule 3.10 
(text set forth above) provides the framework for answering this 
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question. It states that the Board of Pardons may rescind an 
offender's parole date if the Board receives a written referral 
indicating that an offender has violated correctional institution 
rules or the laws of any local, state, or federal government, or 
new evidence is presented which shows that the offender, if 
released, would present a serious risk or danger to the 
community. 
On May 9, 1988, the Board of Pardons had received no written 
referral from any source which suggested that Mr. Northern had 
violated institutional rules. Thus, that portion of Rule 3,10 is 
inapplicable. Additionally, the grant of parole had not been 
rescinded upon its own terms because of any violation of 
institutional rules. 
Under the second alternative under Rule 3.10, this Court 
defines "new evidence1' as negative information received by the 
Board of Pardons between the time that a parole release date is 
set and the time that a rescission determination is made. In 
this case those dates are July 8, 1981 and May 9, 1988. This 
Court defines "risk or danger to the community" to include the 
situation where a person is likely to commit a crime. 
After a careful analysis of the entire record in this case 
and kooping in mind that this Court cannot substitute its 
judgment for that of the Board of Pardons, this Court's ruling is 
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that there was "new evidence" received by the Board of Pardons 
which justified the Board's decision to rescind Mr. Northern's 
May 10, 1988 parole date. There was evidence regarding Mr. 
Northern's drug use at the Utah State Prison and drug use at the 
Duchesne County Jail. Such drug use was illegal. There was also 
evidence which showed that Mr. Northern failed to show any 
remorse for his victim or regarding the crimes he had committed 
and that his behavior was, to some extent, anti-social. This new 
evidence indicated thatr if releasedr Mr. Northern would present 
a serious risk or danger to the community. 
Also, the circumstances relating to Mr. Northern on May 9, 
1990, constituted extraordinary circiunstances under Rule 3.10 
which justified the rescission of th^ parole date without 
providing prior notice to Mr. Northern. 
Additionally, a review of the entire record leads the Court 
to Conclude that the Board of Pardons did not rescind Mr. 
Northern's parole release date because it believed he deserved to 
be incarcerated for a longer period of time because of the nature 
of his crime. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
For the reasons set forth above, the Board of Pardons did 
not violate Mr. Northern's constitutional rights. The petition 
9 
for a writ of habeas corpus is, therefor^, denied with prejudice, 
DATED THIS j_ DAY OF DECEMBER, /990. 
rUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: - - - ... .--^ n, A T T E S T 
By 
JC^CAROL NESSET-SALE 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM C 
Further, because petitioner's constitutional rights have not been 
violated, his parole period should not be reduced. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PETITIONER WAS PAROLED ON JULY 9, 1991, 
THEREFORE, THE ISSUES IN THIS APPEAL ARE 
RENDERED MOOT. 
Petitioner requests that this Court order his immediate 
parole subject to reasonable terms and conditions (Brief of 
Appellant [hereafter Br. of App.] at 29). He also asks for other 
relief that the court may determine to be appropriate under law 
and equity (Br. of App. at 29). Because petitioner was paroled 
on July 9, 1991, he has received his requested relief. As a 
result, the issues before this Court are moot. In the event the 
court elects to proceed with this matter, however, appellees have 
briefed the issues in full. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE MAKING A CORRECTNESS DETERMINATION ON 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
NECESSARILY INCORPORATES A REVIEW OF THE 
TRIAL COURT'S RESOLUTION OF FACTUAL 
QUESTIONS, THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION SHOULD 
BE GIVEN SOME DEFERENCE. 
This case is unusual in that this Court is dealing with 
two levels of review i.e., the trial court's review of the Board 
of Pardons' action and this Court's review of the trial court's 
conclusion based on that review. The issue before the trial 
court on July 27, 1990, at the hearing on petitioner's petition 
for writ of habeas corpus was whether or not there was any 
reasonable basis in the record that would support the Board of 
9 
Pardons' decision to rescind petitioner's parole date (R. at 101 
p. 14; R. at 102, p.135). The issue before this Court is whether 
the trial court was correct in concluding that the record 
supported the Board of Pardons' decision to rescind petitioner's 
prospective parole release date. 
As a general rule, the correction-of-error standard 
applies to agency rulings on issues of law and extends no 
deference to agency rulings. An agency's findings of fact, 
however, are accorded substantial deference and will not be 
overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another 
conclusion from the evidence is permissible. As to questions of 
mixed law and fact, a reviewing court usually accords a agency 
decision some deference, i.e., an agency's decision will not be 
set aside unless the agency's conclusion is unreasonable. Hurley 
v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n, 767 P.2d 524, 526-527 (Utah 
1988). 
The rationale behind the reasonableness standard is 
that issues of mixed law and fact are often illuminated by an 
agency's expertise. JEcL at 527. Further, an agency's special 
technical knowledge may be of particular help in determining 
whether the facts of a specific case are governed by a certain 
rule or statute. JEd. Therefore, a reviewing court will give 
some deference to an agency's decision, when that decision 
involves an area of technical expertise or an area where the 
legislature has specifically granted the agency discretion in its 
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decision-making process• Savage Industries v. Utah State Tax 
Comm. , 160 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 7 (Utah 1991). 
The legislature granted the Board of Pardons discretion 
in its decision-making process in Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) 
(1985) which states: 
The determinations and decisions of the Board 
of Pardons in cases involving approval or 
denial of any action, of paroles, pardons, 
commutations or terminations of sentence, 
orders of restitution, or remission of fines, 
forefeitures [sic], and restitution, are 
final and are not subject to judicial 
review.3 
Because of the Board of Pardons' inherent expertise and its 
decision-making power, the trial court correctly applied the 
reasonableness standard. 
Contrary to petitioner's assertion that the Mtrial 
court . . • found himself unable to determine with any kind of 
specificity why [petitioner's] parole has been rescinded" (Br. of 
App, at 24), the court issued detailed findings that support its 
conclusions. The trial judge reviewed the procedures of the 
Board under a reasonableness standard and denied petitioner's 
petition for writ of habeas corpus because the Board of Pardons 
did not violate his constitutional rights (R. at 97-98). The 
trial judge was candid in explaining his role in making this 
determination: 
3
 Although this statute states that Board of Pardons 
decisions are not subject to judicial review, review of 
procedural due process claims are not precluded. Hatch v. 
DeLand, 790 P.2d 49, 50 (Utah App. 1990). 
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We're talking about some areas of the law 
that are new, unique* And I'm confident that 
regardless of what I do, this matter is going 
to be reviewed by another court, and that's 
fine. I have no — that's the way the system 
works* But that doesn't mean that I want to 
give it less consideration than I otherwise 
might* And if it's going to be reviewed, 
then for that reason alone it ought to have 
my best efforts. . . . [T]he parties are 
entitled to my best call on this* • . * I'm 
certainly not going to substitute my judgment 
for the Board of Pardons * 
(R. at 102, p. 134-35). It is evident from these comments, that 
the trial court intended to conduct careful review of the facts 
of this case and the law pertaining to this case before reaching 
any conclusions* 
At the September 26, 1990 hearing, the trial court 
stated: 
After careful analysis of this entire 
record, and that includes all the prison 
records that were received, the transcripts 
of the various hearings that were had, all 
the information that was submitted, I cannot 
say that this record shows me that the Board 
of Pardons have [sic] no evidence before it 
that would not allow a conclusion that there 
was new evidence, and that if there was a 
release that there was not a potential risk 
to the community. There is evidence to 
suggest that the conclusion reached was not 
arbitrary or caprecious [sic] or without any 
foundation whatsoever. 
I hasten to point out that the test is 
not whether or not this court agrees with the 
conclusion* That is not the standard. 
Because I've already said, it's not my 
prerogative to substitute my judgment for 
that of the Board of Pardons* I'm only 
reviewing this record to determine whether or 
not there is any reasonable basis upon which 
they could make a finding, and reach a 
conclusion that if [petitioner] was released 
on a parole date scheduled, that he could 
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present a serious risk, or danger to the 
community. And so as I reviewed the record, 
as I've indicated, I'm satisfied that there 
is some evidence to support that conclusion 
by the Board of Pardons. 
(R. at 101, pp. 13-14) (Emphasis added). Thus, after careful 
review, the trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that 
"there was new evidence received by the Board of Pardons which 
justified the Board's decision to rescind [petitioner's] May 10, 
1988 parole date" and that the "circumstances relating to 
[petitioner] on May 9, 1988, constituted extraordinary 
circumstances under Rule 3.10 which justified the rescission of 
the parole date without providing prior notice to [petitioner]" 
(R. at 97). 
Based on the foregoing, this court should give some 
deference to the trial judge's determination, rather than conduct 
strict correctness review. 
POINT III 
PETITIONER HAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO BE RELEASED ON PAROLE PRIOR TO THE 
EXPIRATION OF HIS SENTENCE. 
On July 30, 1980, petitioner was sentenced to two five-
to life sentences at the Utah State Prison (R. at 90). As 
acknowledged by petitioner, the Utah Board of Pardons determines 
the exact length of time the person actually serves (Br. of App. 
at 13). In Kelly v. Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board, 637 P.2d 
858 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 923 (1982), the 
court stated: 
Being given a parole docket date does not 
mean that a prisoner is going to be placed on 
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parole; it means that a prisoner is going to 
be considered for parole. There is a 
possibility that parole may be granted; there 
is also a possibility that parole may be 
denied. . . . Since the petitioner has been 
given no recognized liberty interest by 
having a docket date set, he has not been 
deprived of any constitutional right by 
having that date changed. 
Kelly, 637 P.2d at 858, 859. 
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals 
follow the Oklahoma court's reasoning and have determined that 
absent a state created right, an incarcerated person has no 
inherent right to be released prior to the expiration of the 
sentence. Homer v. Morris, 684 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984); Hatch v. 
DeLandf 790 P.2d 49 (Utah App. 1990). In Hatch, this Court 
stated: 
[AJbsent statutory language limiting a parole 
board's discretion, "[t]here is no 
constitutional or inherent right of a 
convicted person to be conditionally released 
before the expiration of a valid sentence." 
(citation omitted). 
Id. at 51. No such statutory language exists in Utah. Where no 
substantial right exists, there can be no violation of that 
right. 
This issue was also addressed in White v. Utah State 
Board of Pardons, 778 P.2d 20, 21 (Utah App. 1989). White 
involved a parole revocation hearing rather than a parole 
recision hearing, however, the court's reasoning is helpful to 
the present case. The court stated: " [Petitioner has not 
demonstrated that the Board's actions violate a substantial 
constitutional right. This petition is clearly a request for 
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judicial review of a Board of Pardons decision and is precluded 
by section 77-27-5(3)." White, 778 P.2d at 21. This Court 
further stated that our sentencing system vests almost complete 
discretion in the Board of Pardons to determine the actual time 
served. 
In the present case, the trial court concluded as a 
matter of law that "[t]he Courts should not interfere or review 
particular Board of Pardons decisions lightly and should not 
reverse or set aside such decisions unless the Board of Pardons 
has clearly violated a constitutional right of the offender" (R. 
at 95). Petitioner has not suffered a violation of a substantial 
constitutional right because he has no right to be released on 
parole prior to the expiration of his sentence. Therefore, this 
Court should affirm the decisions of the Board of Pardons and the 
trial court. 
POINT IV 
THE BOARD OF PARDONS DID NOT VIOLATE ITS OWN 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AND PETITIONER WAS 
NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE 
PROCESS. 
A. The Board of Pardons' decision to 
rescind petitioner's May 10, 1988 parole 
date based on "new evidence" was 
justified. 
Petitioner argues that there was no new evidence before 
the Board of Pardons that justified the rescission of his parole 
date (Br. of App. at 18). Petitioner's claim is not supported by 
the record. 
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At the July 27, 1990 hearing, the trial court invited 
counsel for petitioner and defendants to submit briefs on the 
meaning of "new evidence" (R. at 102, pp. 131-32). No briefs 
were submitted. Therefore, the court defined "new evidence" as: 
"negative information received by the Board of Pardons between 
the time that a parole release date is set and the time that a 
recision determination is made" (R. at 96). In this case those 
dates are July 8, 1981 and May 9, 1988. Petitioner claims that 
the "trial court also found himself unable to determine with any 
kind of specificity why [petitioner's] parole had been rescinded 
[and that] the trial court dismissed this problem by finding that 
there was some evidence in the record which could have served as 
a basis for the rescission" (Br, of App. at 24). At the hearing 
on September 26, 1990, the trial court specified the incidents 
that constituted new evidence. 
There was drug use early on after the 
initial parole date was set. And there was 
drug use when [petitioner] was in Duschene 
County Jail recently, albeit it was minimal, 
but it was still there. It's still a 
violation of the law, and it was still 
inappropriate conduct. And I think 
[petitioner] knew that- There were problems 
perhaps early on, but still new evidence 
regarding discipline at the Utah State 
Prison. 
There is information in psychological 
reports that were received after the initial 
Board of Pardons' date was set, or after the 
initial date was set for parole from the 
Board of Pardons that was developed that 
showed a number of things, antisocial 
personality, lack of remorse, a number of 
things. 
And finally, there were a number of 
problems with regard to the nature of the 
release that [petitioner] sought, and the 
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type of parole that he was anticipating, and 
whether or not that could be accomplished in 
any fashion, and might still protect the 
community . . . there is evidence in this 
record as I've indicated that would support 
the finding and conclusion of new evidence 
that presents a substantial risk. 
(R. at 101, p.14-15). 
At the September 26, 1990 hearing and in appellant's 
brief, petitioner asserts that incidents of drug use occurring 
prior to 1984 cannot be considered "new.M The trial court 
addressed petitioner's assertion stating: "Information was 
received both before and after [the 1984 review date] that would 
be enough in my judgment to support the conclusions reached by 
the Board of Pardons when they did . . . it doesn't make any 
difference because there's information both before and after 
[1984]" (R. at 101, p. 17-18). 
Because the record overwhelmingly supports the trial 
court's conclusion that there was "new evidence" received by the 
Board of Pardons which justified the Board's decision to rescind 
petitioner's May 10, 1988 proposed parole date, this court should 
affirm the trial court's ruling. 
B, The Board of Pardons' actions fell 
within the exception to Rule 3.10. 
Petitioner alleges that the Board of Pardons violated 
its own policies and procedures in rescinding his May 10, 1988 
parole release date (Br. of App. at 14). In May and July of 
1988, the Utah Board of Pardons was operating under R655-310-1 
and R655-310-2. See Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and 
Rules of this brief. 
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On May 5, 1988, five days before petitioner's proposed 
parole date, the Board of Pardons received new information in a 
psychological evaluation (Def. Exh. #24 and included in this 
brief as Addendum E). The seven day notification deadline had 
already passed and therefore, the extraordinary circumstances 
exception to Rule 3,10 attached. The recommendation portion of 
the report reads: 
It is this writer's recommendation that 
[petitioner], if he is paroled, be placed in 
a supportive environment such as family or 
friends to make transition to society as 
uneventful as possible. It is strongly 
recommended that, in addition to any mental 
health treatment, [petitioner] receive drug 
abuse counseling. 
FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS 
DETERMINATIONS, THIS REPORT IS TO BE REGARDED 
AS A FAVORABLE ONE. 
(Def. Exh. #24, p.2, Addendum E) (emphasis added). This section 
of the report is just a recommendation and is not dispositive. 
The Board is not bound by it. The Board's concern over 
petitioner's drug problem outweighed the positive recommendation 
in this case (R. at 92). Specifically, the Board was concerned 
with the fact that petitioner viewed his drug dependency as a 
major factor in his anti-social behavior (R. at 92). The Board 
was also concerned that petitioner admitted that he was high on 
LSD at the time he committed his crime, and that he had used LSD, 
cocaine, amphetamines, and marijuana (R. at 91-92). Finally, the 
Board indicated that petitioner's major problem was his inability 
to deal with life's stresses without the use of illegal 
substances (R. at 92). 
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Given the date that the Board received petitioner's 
first psychological evaluation, and given its concern regarding 
petitioners drug use, extraordinary circumstances existed which 
justified the rescission of petitioner's proposed parole 
date. 
POINT V 
THE BOARD OF PARDONS' ACTIONS DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
Petitioner asserts that the Board of Pardons' actions 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment (Br. of App. at 28). 
The recision of petitioner's May 10, 1988 proposed parole date 
did not violate the eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment under the federal constitution or petitioner's 
state constitutional right under Article I § 9. 
Relying on Penrv v. Lynauqh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), 
petitioner asserts that the Board of Pardons' actions fell short 
of the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society. Petitioner fails, however, to recognize that 
the United States Supreme Court carefully explained what it meant 
by the "evolving standards" statement in Penrv. "In discerning 
those 'evolving standards,' we have looked to objective evidence 
of how our society views a particular punishment today. The 
clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary 
values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures." 
Penrv, 492 U.S. at 302 (citations omitted). 
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Significantly, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202 (Supp. 1988) 
gives the Board of Pardons the exclusive power to determine the 
length of time an inmate actually serves. 
Nothing in this section shall preclude the 
board of pardons from the paroling or 
discharging an inmate at any time within the 
discretion of the board of pardons. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-202(5) (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added). 
Because the Board is authorized by statute to permit or deny 
parole at any time, its actions did not constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
In his brief petitioner asks, in effect: What could be 
more cruel than rescinding his prospective parole date the day 
before it was to go into effect? The facts of Solem v. Helm, 463 
U.S. 277 (1983), answer petitioner's question. In Solem, the 
defendant was convicted of "uttering" a "no account" check for 
$100.00. Due to his prior record, he was subject to South 
Dakota's recidivist statute which enhanced the felony to a class 
one felony. The maximum penalty for such a felony was life 
imprisonment in the state penitentiary without possibility of 
parole and a $125,000.00 fine. The United States Supreme Court 
held that under these facts the sentence was significantly 
disproportionate to the crime and therefore violative of the 
eighth amendment. Solem, 463 U.S. at 303. 
By contrast, in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), 
petitioner sought habeas corpus relief from his state confinement 
as he had received a life sentence under the Texas recidivist 
statute and claimed it violated the eighth amendment as grossly 
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disproportionate to the crimes. He had been convicted of two 
prior felonies for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain 
$80.00 worth of goods and passing a forged check in the amount of 
$28.36. His third felony conviction was for obtaining $120.75 by 
false pretenses. He was sentenced to a life sentence. The 
United States Supreme Court held that "the mandatory life 
sentence imposed upon this petitioner does not constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments." Petitioners conviction was affirmed. 
In comparing petitioner's case with Solem and Rummel, 
the Board of Pardon's action was appropriate given its concerns 
about petitioner's drug use and the risk to society if he was 
paroled. It is important to note however, that at the same time 
the Board affirmed the rescission of his parole date, it also 
ordered a rehearing in May of 1990 (R. at 94). This added two 
years to petitioner's sentence but also indicated that there was 
still a possibility for parole. 
The clearest and most reliable objective evidence of 
contemporary values in Utah in 1988 was that the Board of Pardons 
could rescind a scheduled parole or termination date at any time 
prior to an inmates release without infringing upon any 
constitutional right of an inmate. See State v. Alvillar, 748 
P.2d 207, 208-209 (Utah App. 1988). Because the Board received 
new evidence regarding petitioner's drug use and potential risk 
to the community, it had good cause for rescinding his May 10, 
1988 proposed parole date on May 9, 1990. Its action fell within 
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legislatively prescribed limits and simply fails to "shock the 
moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper 
under the circumstances." st-.ate v. Russell, 791 P. 2d 188, 190 
(Utah 1990) (setting forth the test for determining whether 
punishment is cruel and unusual in specific applications). 
The burden of showing that the Board of Pardon's action 
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment is on petitioner. He 
has failed to demonstrate that the Board's action violated his 
federal and state constitutional rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, appellees respectfully request 
that this court affirm the trial court's order denying 
petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus and deny any 
request to have his parole period reduced i 
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